RIGHTS IN REM

We may begin by inquiring, What is a right in rem?
The definition of Austin adopted from the modern civilians
has been so often repeated that it seems primafaciea doubtful
labor at this late day to question it. The definition runs as
follows: "Rights in rem may be defined in the following
manner-'rights residing in persons and availing against
other persons generally.' Or they may be defined thus:
'Rights residing in persons, and answering to duties incumbent upon other persons generally. By a crowd of modern
civilians jus in rem has been defined as follows: 'facultas
homini competens, sine respectu ad certain personam,' a definition I believe invented by Grotius.",
Difficulty has often been found with the terminology,'
but, in essence, Austin's definition, or, perhaps, more accurately, the civilian definition, remains the standard accepted one, not only in Anglo-American, but also in Continental jurisprudence.3 But in recent years discussions have
appeared which expressly or implicitly raise doubts as to the.
validity of the civilian definition.
It has been, heretofore, universally admitted that rights
and duties are correlatives. One can not speak of a right
without at the same time implying a duty, nor, conversely,.
can one speak of a duty without at the same time implying
a right. Right and duty are two sides of the same idea.
Consequently, when a right begins or ends, a corresponding.
duty begins or ends; and, conversely, when a duty begins or
ends, a corresponding right begins or ends. 4 The analysis
of "protected rights" by Mr. Terry in his notable book,5
I Austin, "Jurisprudence," (4th Ed.).
'Thus, Holland, ("Jur." 143, iith Ed.) who would prefer to speak (144)
of "rights of indeterminate incidence." See also Markby, "Elements of Law,"
§165 (6th Ed.).

3 Windscheid, ("Pandekten," 9th Ed.) whose book is the leading Continental work in its field, says that "absolute rights [rights in rem] are those which
avail against all persons" (§4).
4Austin, "Juris." I, 34 (4th Ed.).
'"Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law," Philadelphia, 1884.
(322)
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-seems to run counter to the classical notion of the correspondence in terms of right and duty, if "protected rights" are
rights at all and not merely, as Mr. Salmond has suggested6
"the objects of rights stricto sensu."

In speaking of rights

7
in rem Mr. Terry says:
"Sometimes the investitive facts on which the right
,depends may arise independently of the reinaining investitive facts whose presence is necessary to the creation of the

duty, and even at different times."

Mr. Terry gives as an example of such a severance of
right and duty, the case where one takes possession of a thing
previouly unowned with the intention of becoming owner.
He admits that duties exist arising out of the facts stated
against certain persons, but adds that as to persons not
within the jurisdiction of the state which confers the rights,
duties do not exist, but first come into existence when these
persons come within the jurisdiction. In order fully to
,understand the point, it is necessary to go back to Mr. Terry's
analysis of "protected rights." In passing, it may be remarked that no analysis is to be found in the literature of
jurisprudence which shows a more interesting and penetrating
dialectic and which at the same tikne is more difficult of
apprehension than.Mr. Terry's discussion of "correspondent"
,and "protected" rights.
The content of a "correspondent" right according to
Mr. Terry is acts, while the content of a "protected" right
"is a condition of fact which will begin or continue to exist
as a consequence of the acts being done or omitted."8 One
of the very striking pecularities of the analysis is that to
give a cause of action, it is not sufficient that a "correspondent" right be violated-the "protected" right also must
be infringed. In sohne cases, that is to say, in the case of
rights in personam, the same act violates both the correspondent right and the protected right, but in the case of
.rights in rem, the mere violation of the correspondent right
' Salmond, "Jurisprudence," §76, p. 197, n.
7 "Leading Principles," §129.
8 Op.cit., §125.

2

(3rd Ed.).
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is not enough for an actionable claim, since the protected
right is not necessarily infringed. One of Mr. Terry's illustrations will make this more definite:
"Suppose that a city is charged by statute with the duty
of keeping its streets in repair and negligently allows a dangerous hole in one of them to remain open and unguarded.
A, when passing along the road at night and using due care,
falls into the hole and breaks his leg. The first impulse of
any one on being asked what duty the city had broken would
be to reply, the duty to keep the street in repair, or at least
to use due diligence to keep it in repair; and if asked what
right of A's was violated, to answer, his right of personal
security. But this brings up difficulties. If the statement
of the duty is correct, then it was broken as soon as the street
was allowed to remain in the unsafe condition and a reasonable opportunity had been presented for making the repairs,
and before A fell into the hole; and it would equally have
been broken had A never fallen in at all. Consequently,
whatever right of this kind corresponded to the duty must
have been at the same time violated. But A's right of personal security was not violated until he was actually hurt."'
Another of Mr. Terry's illustrations will be useful:
"Let A, for example be the possessor of a large dog
having a propensity known to A, to kill sheep, and let B be
a neighbor of A's and the possessor of sheep. A owes a duty
to B to keep his dog from killing the sheep, and B has a correspondent right covering exactly the same ground as the
duty, that the dog be kept from so doing. Here the two
sets of facts, the possession of the dog on one side and of the
sheep on the other . . . are obviously quite independent of each other. A may have had the dog with the knowrn
vicious propensities long before B had any sheep, or, on the
other hand, B might have kept a flock of sheep if A had never
possessed a dog . . . If B is the possessor of sheep,
though he will not have a correspondent right against A of
the sort just mentioned until A becomes possessed of a dog,
9 Op. cit.,

§II9.
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yet there may be often persons in the vicinity having such
dogs between whom and B complete jural relations will at
once exist . .
Still it is conceivable that a right of
this kind, a preparedness to have jural relations, might exist
where there was no one who had any corresponding duty."0
An example of the situation last mentioned is where "the
legislature should create a new sort of property right in the
sea or seabottom below low-water mark or in waste lands
belonging to the state, to be acquired by filing a claim in
some public office, but available only against aliens. A man
who had duly filed his claim might be said to have a right,
although there was not for time being a single alien within
the jurisdiction of the State." n
These illustrations may be summarized under three
juristic situations"
(i) Where certain acts, required by law for the protection of the interests of personal property, security, and
other life interests, are not performed, but no invasion of
the interest results from what is done or omitted to be done;
as, for example, the case of the failure of a municipality
after reasonable notice of a defect in the public street, to
repair.
(2) Where, as to persons within the jurisdiction, there
is an absence, on one side or the other, of the facts necessary
to create a jural nexus as to certain specific acts; as, for
example, when A owns sheep but there is no owner of a
vicious dog, or when there is an owner of a vicious dog but
no owner of sheep.
(3)Where there is an interest but no person can be
found in the jurisdiction who owes a duty in respect of it;
as, for example, ownership of the seabottom as against
aliens only.
As to the first situation, it is clearly incorrect to say
that the mere failure to keep a street in repair is a violation
of any duty. This usage, however, is prevalent in technical
parlance, but only as an elliptical expression, where the con10.7d.
1

1 d.
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sequences of the omission are already present. It is difficult
to see the inconvenience of saying that the coinplete and accurate expression of the duty is to exercise reasonable care
to avoid harm to the interest of another. It seems contrary
therefore, to the usage of professional speech (properly
understood as an elliptical symbol) and to the prevailing
scientific analysis to regard an act of the kind under consideration (i. e., a duty in rem) as a violation of any right
whatsoever. The supposed difficulty presented by the fact
that the persons to whom the duty-act is due may be unknown or be not yet within the jurisdiction, seems to rest
on the view that the duty in such a case exists in solido,
while the corresponding rights exist pro parte. It is the merit
of the late Professor Hohfeld to have brought out clearly that
in its normal ambit a so-called right in rem is not a single
right, but that there are as many rights in rem as there are
persons who owe corresponding duties.12 As to all personsat least as to all those already in the jurisdiction-the municipality in the example given, owes each one a duty not to cause
harm to his indrests. If strict legal theory requires that
when any one of such persons goes out of the jurisdiction,
the particular duty which was due to him ccmes to a legal
end, there is no diminution of the duties owed to all other
persons. If there is any inconvenience in regarding duties
as owed to persons who are not ascertained, this inconvenience is one which embraces all so-called rights in rem. The
obvious solution is to abolish all rights in rem.
As to the second situation, it may be argued that A, an
owner of sheep, is as much entitled as against B, his neighbor, not to have his sheep killed by a vicious dog of B's as
well before as after B becomes possessed of such a dog.
Whether B presently has such a dog or not would seem to be
irrelevant. The duty is conceptual and not factual. The
law takes no note in prescribing duties whether the person
owing the duty has the physical or economic capacity to
perform or to violate his duty. This may be illustrated even
12 Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-

soning," Yale, L. J., XXVI- 710 (740 sq.).
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in rights in personain where the inability of a debtor to pay
does not in the slightest way affect the full measure of his
legal duty. But the converse of the argument does not
follow. The owner of a vicious dog can not owe duties to
another with respect to an ownership of sheep, unless such
other person owns sheep. The existence and ownership of
sheep are the investitive facts which create at once the right
and the corresponding duty. If the physical or economic
capacity of persons owing duties were to be taken into account for any purpose, then such factors would be essential
for consideration for all similar purposes; and it might then
be claimed that a resident of New York City has no right
not to have an assault and battery committed against him
by a resident of Buffalo because the physical distance between the owner of the right and the bearer of the proposed
duty is too great to make the violation physically possible.
To say, as Mr. Terry does, that correspondent rights are
enlarged by the fact that a man stores gun-powder in his
house, or becomes editor of a newspaper and may thus utter
libelous statements, is clearly a departure from the traditional
analysis of rights in rem; since it would appear that correspondent rights in rem avail not as against persons generally
but only against those who have the physical capacity to violate one of the specific duties which the law prescribes for the
protection of interests. Whether one agrees with Mr. Terry's
analysis or not, it has the great value of emphasizing the
complex and varied character of legal duties. When the
point of departure in juristic or legal analysis is rights instead of duties, the richness of detail of legal duties as dependent on factual circumstances is sure to be submerged in
a meaningless generalization difficult of practical application.73
As to the third situation, where there is no person within
the jurisdiction who owes a duty, it may be argued that just
as the investitive facts of a right are determinative as well
of the duty as of the right, regardless of the physical capa13It is to be noted, however, that Mr. Terry adopts a double arrangement of rights and duties treated separately: op. cit., §337.
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city of the bearer of the duty either to perform it or to vio-late it, so likewise the determinative fact of such a right as
is now under consideration is the place of its legal recognition and not the residence of the bearer or bearers of the
corresponding duty or duties. The law has nothing to do
with the exigibility of a claim. The right exists where the
law promises legal remedies concerning it. 14 If it were
otherwise, when a debtor removed to another jurisdiction.
the creditor's right would become extinguished, or, at least,
would becoyne reduced to the level of an imperfect right.
In the seabottom example, when there is no alien within the
jurisdiction, there is a protected right in the seabottom as an
object of ownership, but there are no corresponding duties,
according to Mr. Terry, because there is no one within the
jurisdiction who can owe a duty. The only point of contact
here with our discussion is that it is a case of a protected
right in rem where there are no duties; but it seems clear
that Mr. Salmond's suggestion is substantially correct, and
that Mr. Terry's category of protected rights are not rights
at all but only the objects for which rights in the strict sense
are created.'5 While Mr. Terry appears to accept the
civilian definition of rights in rem, his actual analysis of
"correspondent" rights in rem is a departure in introducing
a factual element which disturbs the classical synchronism
of right and duty, and, by way of corollary, eliminates the
indeterminate element which is the characteristic factor of
the definition, by limiting the jural relation to concrete
data which serve to identify the persons owing duties. In
a certain sense, the persons of incidence of the right are still
indeterminate since the investitive facts of the duty may be
independent of the investitive facts of the right, but this
14It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the local situation of
rights, or questions of private international law which grow out of a recognition
of rights in plural jurisdictions.
15An idea in some respects similar to Mr. Terry's "Protected Right"
is the "Rechtsverband" developed by Puntschart but derived theoretically
from Roman law sources, and employed for other technical purposes: "Die
Moderne Theorie des Privatrechts und Ihre Grundbegrifflichen Mangel," Leipzig, 1893.
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indeterminateness is of another kind than the civilian definition implies since by that definition there is but a single set
of investitive facts which mark, at the same instant, the
right and the duty.
The next doubt which has been raised against the traditional definition is that suggested by Mr. Salmond in a work
celebrated for its clarity of presentation. Mr. Salmond
says:
"In defining a real right (right in rem) as one availing
against the world at large, it is not meant that the incidence
of the correlative duty is absolutely universal, but merely
that the duty binds persons in general, and that if any one
is not bound his case is exceptional . . . Even as so
explained, however, it can scarcely be denied, that if intended
as an exhaustive classification of all possible cases, the distinction between real and personal rights [rights in rem and
rights in personam]-between duties of general and of determinate incidence-is logically defective. "16
The author then proceeds to give as an illustration the
example proposed by Mr. Terry:
"Why should there not be rights available against
particular classes of persons, as opposed to the whole community and to persons individually determined, for example
a right available only against aliens? An examination,
however, of the contents of any actual legal system will
reveal the fact that duties of this suggested description
either do not exist at all, or are so exceptional that we are
justified in classing them as anomalous. As a classification,
therefore, of the rights which actually obtain legal recognition, the distinction between real and personal rights may be
accepted as valid. ,,7
According to this analysis, there are theoretically duties
of three, instead of two, classes of incidence-duties of indeterminate incidence where neither the individuals nor the
classes have been identified; duties of partly indeterminate
16Salmond,

17 Id.

"Jurisprudence," §81, P. 208 (3rd Ed.).
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incidence, where the class or classes but not the individuals
have been identified; and duties of determinate incidence
where the individuals themselves have been identified (or
may be identified). But since the duties are not duties of
classes as such, it would seem that the dichotomy of the
original classification can not be assailed even theoretically
if otherwise valid. The analysis of Mr. Salmond is based
on the misconception, which Professor Hohfeld has corrected,"8 that duties exist in solido. Since duties are duties
of persons and not of classes, these persons are identifiable, or
they are not. Even though the pursuit of identification is
narrowed to a class such limitation is still insufficient to identify the actual individual persons who owe duties.
The suggestion, though ineffective as a logical distincttion, is still useful in calling attention again to the vagueness
of the terminology. The phrasing, "against the whole
world" (which 'Markby calls an "arrogant phrase"), "persons generally," or "indeterminate incidence" lack the
qualities of logical precision. The expression "indeterminnate incidence" is the least objectionable, and as an ultimate characterization is probably faultless. Its chief defect is that it disregards the legal causation which finakes
some duties indeterminate rather than determinate. It
leaves the mystery unexplored why in one group of cases
the persons who owe duties are legally important, .while in
the other group their identity (more correctly, identifiability)
is of no consequence. All these terms are descriptive rather
than definitive, and while they are usually sufficient for the
purpose, especially when accompanied by concrete illustrations, they fail in conveying any clear-cut distinction in the
jural relations to which they are sought to be applied. We
gain no more by these interpretations in accuracy than if we
called rights in rem "general rights,' 19 and rights in personam "special rights."
18See note

12,

supra.

19 A learned colleague (Dean Wigmore, "Select Cases on the Law of Torts."

II, (Summary, §8) p. 836) has developed a novel classification of "recusable
nexus" (jural relation created with the assent of the person bound) and "irre-
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The completest examination of the nature of rights
in rem is that made by Professor Hohfeld,20 the distinguished
leader of the Yale jurisprudence group the unity of which
has been recently broken by the untimely death of Mr.
Hohfeld, and the later retirement froin Yale of an enthusiastic co-worker, Professor Cook. Professor Hohfeld shows
that the term, right in rem, has a four-fold application: (a)
in pri'nary rights; (e. g., rights [strict sense] in rem); (b),
judicial proceedings (e. g., action in rem); (c) judgments
and decrees (e. g., decree in rem); (d) enforcement of judgments and decrees (e. g., writ of assistance-secondary decree in rem).
For the purpose of avoiding the "linguistic contamination" which resides in the term "right in rem," Professor
Hohfeld substitutes "multital claim," and he defines it as-t .
One of a large class of fundamentally similar
cusable nexus" (jural relation created without the assent of the person bound).
Both divisions are theoretically sub-divisible into universal (binding all members of the state) nexus and particular (binding only one person or a class) nexus.
"The group of irrecusable universal nexus includes only one topic, torts; here
termed general rights." It is clear, of course, that torts are not rights of any
kind, but what is perhaps intended is that torts are the wrongs wbich flow from
a violation of the kinds of rights found in an irrecusable universal nexus. The
doubt is due to what follows: The author says, speaking of "general rights,"
"The burden of respecting them must be imposed on all persons without exception regardless whether they assent." This seems to go back to the category
of rights in rem. It may be objected that some torts (unless the prevailing
definition is amended, and we think it should be) may present a case of irrecusable particular nexus (e. g., liability of a common carrier, innkeeper, public
warehouseman). Our own preference would be to have a clear-cut distinction
where torts (or delicts) are infringements of rights in rem and nothing else, and
where quasi delicts would absorb the residual cases of wrongs, now called torts,
which are violations of rights in personam (e. g., duties resting on individuals
who belong to a particular class, and who, to reverse the phrase, owe (contingent).
duties in rem). The striking feature of Professor Wigmore's new classification
lies in that, while it rests on a single fundamentum divisionis, is constituted of
two elements. The usual classifications rest either on the character of the
claim (right), on the content (act to be performed), the persons owing the act
(identifiable or not), or the interest (objective situation protected or to be attained). An example may be given of each: claim-perfect right; contentprimary right (involving a duty act); persons-right in rem; interest-proprietary
right. In Professor Wigmore's classification, duties and liabilities are found
both in irrecusable nexus (e. g., tort (liability); hereditary status (child's duty
to parent) and in recusable nexus (e. g., contract (duty); false representations
(liability)). The characteristic features of this classification are shown by the
fact that a violation of a contract duty seems to be an irrecusable nexus while
deceit (as classified) is a recusable nexus.
20"Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,'

Yale, L. J., XXVI, 710.

332

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single
person (or single group of persons) but availing respectively
against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class
of people.

"21

For the contrasting term, "right in personam," Professor Hohfeld substitutes "paucital claim" which he defines
as-

A unique right residing in a person (or group
of persons) and availing against a single person (or single
group of persons); or else it is one of a few fundamentally
similar, yet separate rights availing against a few definite
persons. "22

Professor Hohfeld would have been the first to repel
the thought that an approximate definition would suffice,
where a definition was attempted. We shall, therefore, not
hesitate to examine his definition in the spirit in which his
own work was done.
Acknowledgment is due, and it has been made, that
Professor Hohfeld has clarified thought by showing that a
right in rem is correlated by a single duty, but apart from that
contribution it may be doubted if he has made any advance
in his definition of a right in rem. When it is said that a
right in rem is "one of a large class of funda~mentally similar
yet separate rights, "it may be asked, ,What is a large class?
and, What is the meaning of fundamentally similar? The
author was more concerned with the misapplication of the
term under discussion than with the definition, in spite of
the evident care taken to formulate an exact one. The
insufficiency of the definition will be demonstrated if a single
case can be found of a right such as the author illustrates
which avails against only a few persons or against a definite
class of persons. Suppose that A, a land owner, has granted
an easeffient to every person in the state to walk across his
land except to B. What is A's right against B with respect
to the duty not to come on the land? By the definition it
is a right in personam. Moreover, it would be, in the author's
2' Op. cit., 718-author's italics.
2
2 Id.
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terminology, a "unital claim" (i. e., "unique" and "uncompanioned"). Yet, there can be no doubt that this right
is only a right in rem. The proof of the conclusion is A's
right against B was a right in rem before A made grants of
easement to all other persons, and since no new juristic fact
has entered as to this nexus between A and B the right continues to be what it was-a right in rem. Again, to take
the illustration given by Mr. Terry, of a right in the seabottom available only against aliens-this is a right against
a definite class of persons, and if it may be supposed that
there are no rights against non-resident aliens, let it be assumed that X, an alien, becomes a resident. In that case,
and by the supposition, there would be a right in rein against
X only. If these objections are well grounded, we may pass
to the inquiry whether a definition can be constructed of a
right in rem which avoids the criticisms offered.
The attempt has been made to distinguish rights in rem
from rights in personoan by the character of the facts which
give rise to them; rights in rem being based on so-called
general facts (e. g., possession) and rights in personam being
based on so-called special facts (e. g., contract). The terms
general and special, however, are not satisfactory as applied
to facts. They are of indeterminate meaning. They present no single concept out of which a logical propositionmay
be constructed. It would seem, moreover, that all facts are
-special even though it may be urged that some facts give
rise to precisely the same kinds of duties, and may, in that
-sense, be called general. For example, the taking possession
of a thing by occupation, has precisely the same general
incidence of duties in one case as in another; or, again, the
fact of a human being born alive, creates in every case the
same general right of corporal integrity, and, likewise, the
same general incidence of duties. The last illustration shows
the fallacy of the distinction, for the supposed general fact
of birth nay also create rights between parent and child
which are rights in persondm.
Causal relation, also, has been suggested as the true
test of distinction. Rights in rem are those, according to
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this view, which in their origin involve no causal relation
between the parties to the jural nexus, and rights in personam
are those which, on the contrary, show a causal relation between the parties to the jural nexus. Thus, in title by occupation, there is no causal relation between the owner of the
thing and the persons who owe the negative duties of noninterference with the interest of the owner. Again, in contract, there is a causal relation between the parties to the
nexus created by offer and acceptance. But this solution
also breaks down. One illustration will suffice. Where
title to goods is obtained by specification, there is as much of
a causal relation between the old and new owner as in the
case of a violation of a contract duty, yet the right originated
is in rem.
The attempt to base the true distinction on the character of the duties suffers the same fate and is universally
abandoned.2
Rights in rem correspond, in modern law, to
negative duties, but, theoretically, positive duties could be
conceived of as the correlates of rights in rem, as was shown,
at least in principle, in the ancient Hue and Cry legislation.
In modern law, there are still occasional instances of conditional jural nexus where the conditional duty is in rem and
of a positive character. The rule of law which requires the
finder of a lost chattel to deliver it to a public depositary for
the benefit of the owner is in point. The conditional duty
as prescribed by the law rests on all persons within the jurisdiction, but the absolute duty can rest only on the finder.
The conditional positive duty is therefore in rem, but the
absolute duty is in personam. 4 On the other hand, rights
in personam while almost exclusively correlated by positive
duties, may yet embrace negative duties, as may be illustrated by the case of a contract of a seller of a business not
to compete with the buyer, or the contract of the singer who
agrees not to sing in a rival theatre.
22 4 Cf.

Salmond, "Juris.," §81, p. 207 (3rd Ed.).
The category of conditional and absolute duties will not be confused
with absolute and relative duties. See Holland, "Juris.," p. 128 (Ixth Ed.).
The right of a cestui as against third persons--except perhaps as to an equitable
res, Cave v. McKenzie, 46 L. J. Ch. 564-is also a species of conditional right
in rem. The condition is the taking of the trust res with knowledge of the trust.
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Rights are created, modified, and lost through juristic
facts. Only the creative facts need to be noticed since
neither the alteration nor the extinguishment of a jural nexus
is ordinarily of any importance in determining its nature.
The creative fact alone determines what the right is. Juristic facts are of two classes-acts and events-and both must
be considered in an effort to define right in rem, since each
of both classes of facts may create such a right. In the face
of evident difficulty in reaching a right solution, and with a
due appreciation of the peril of attempting a construction
where destruction is the easier task, we venture to propose
that a right in rem is one of which the essential investitive facts
do not serve directly to identify the person who owes the incident
duty. A definition of right in personam will be formulated in
the affirmative-there the essential investitive facts serve
directly to identify the person who owes the incident duty.
It is not probable that this proposal will escape criticism
and in order to aid it at the points where misunderstanding
might arise, a word of explanation may be desirable.
It will be noticed that while in the normal case the number of persons who owe duties corresponding to rights in rem
is large, the definition proposed is not based on that characteristic, since it is not essential.2 5 A crucial illustration will
quickly show the range and application of the definition at
a decisive point. When a person is born, he becomes invested by the mere fact of birth with certain rights in rem
and rights in personam. For example, a child just born
is invested with the right of corporal integrity. This right
avails against all persons including e~ven the mother of the
child. The investitive fact of the right is the being born
alive as a huinan being. The fact that the "mother is A is
25 It has already been suggested above that a right in rem may theoretically
exist against a single person. It is not an extremely exceptional situation that
within the same jurisdiction a right in rern may avail against all persons except
one who himself may have a similar right in rern available against all but the
other, and in the same object, with a territorial division of the operation of the
respective rights as between the two separate owners. This is very likely to
happen in the conflict of common law and registered trademarks. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co. (913) 208 Fed. 513; Sartor v.
Schaden (x9o4) 125 Iowa 696, iol N. W. 511.
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not an essential part of the legally investitive fact, since the
law takes no account of who the mother is or her matrimonial status. The legally operative fact is birth alive as a human being regardless of who is the mother. In this instance
the facts of nature must not be confused with the facts of
the law. Since, therefore, the identity of the ;mother is an
irrelevant natural fact, the essential investitive fact does not
serve directly to point out the mother as one of the persons
who owes an incident duty to the child's right of corporal
integrity.
On the other hand, the birth of the child may create a
right in persondyn to support against the child's father who
may be a hundred miles away at the moment of birth. The
father is directly identified by the essential investitive fact;
but in this case the essential investitive fact has a wider
range than in the first instance. Birth alive, while sufficient
for the right in rem, is insufficient for the right in personam
now under consideration. The investitive legal fact includes
or may include a wide circle of other facts-narriage of the
parents, cohabitation within the period of gestation, birth of
the child. The father is directly pointed out as owing a
duty by the range of facts which the law will consider as
relevant for the purpose of determining the existence of the
right claimed. In rights in rem the identity of the persons
of the incident duties is not material to the determination
of the existence of the right.
It hardly needs to be added that the identity shown or
not shown by the investitive fact hasnoconnectionwithactual
or psychological identification. The claimant of the right
may fail to produce evidence of the identity which the operative facts implicate. Thus one may make a contract with
the B Co., an unincorporated association, consisting of a
thousarid members. The operative facts legally identify
each one of the members, although the actual fact of the
membership may perchance never be ascertained.
Albert Kocourek
Northwestern University, Chicago, Ill.

